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of heroin two weeks 
that defendant had 
& Saf. § was suffi-
m that there was 
cause for defendant's arrest under Pen. Code, 
suhd. 3, without a warrant. 
Id.~Without Warrant-Reasonable Cause.-The of 
does not depend on whether defendant may in fact 
of the offense for which he is arrested, and in 
its validity the court is not limited to a con-
of evidence that would be admissible at the trial 
the issue of guilt. 
!d.-Making Arrest.-\Vhere defendant knew that the arrest-
officer was an ofncer and where he had just admitted 
commission of an offense, the cause of the arrest was 
apparent, and the magistrate was in eon-
that Pen. Code, § 841, relating· to the manner of mak-
was substantially complied with. 
Law-Preliminary Proceedings-Holding to Answer. 
the evidence justified the magistrate's conclusion that 
defendant's arrest was lawful, he properly relie<l on wddence 
search of defendant's person incident to that 
to establish probable cause to believe defendant guilty 
from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
motion to set aside an informa-
Reversed. 
Attorney General, ·william E. James, 
S. Ernest Roll, District 
§ 10; Am.Jur., Arrest, § ,18 et seq. 
2] Arrest, § 12; [3] § 13; [·1] 
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, Jere J. Sullivan, Lewis Watnick and Fred N. 
District Attorneys, for Appellant. 
Charles Chorna for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-By information defendant was charged 
with one count of possessing marijuana in violation of Health 
and Safety Code, section 11500, a felony, and one prior 
conviction of violating the same section. His motion to set 
the information aside (see Pen. Code, § 995) was granted 
on the ground that all of the evidence of the crime other 
than admissions was obtained by an illegal search of his 
person in violation of his constitutional rights. The People 
appeal. 
At the preliminary hearing Deputy Sheriff Henry of Los 
Angeles County testified that on May 27, 1955, he observed de-
fendant sitting behind the wheel of an automobile parked 
across the sidewalk and obstructing pedestrian traffic. On ap-
proaching the car, Henry recognized defendant as a person he 
had arrested on March 17, 1955, on a narcotics charge. He 
spoke to defendant, who was wearing a short-sleeved shirt, and 
observed marks on his right arm that resembled the marks 
made by a hypodermic needle. He asked defendant if he 
was still using narcotics, and defendant stated that he had 
had his last "fix" or injection of heroin approximately two 
weeks ago. Defendant then stated that ''I guess I have had 
it," and Henry repied, "Yes, you are busted now." Henry 
then made a routine search for weapons and found a mari-
juana cigarette in defendant's right front trousers pocket. 
Defendant thereafter told Henry that he was using marijuana 
' 'to kick the heroin addiction.'' 
[1] Section 836, subdivision 3, of the Penal Code provides 
that an officer may make an arrest without a warrant "When 
a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable 
cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.'' 
The foregoing testimony of Deputy Sheriff Henry was suffi-
cient to justify the magistrate in concluding that the de-
fendant's arrest was lawful under this subdivision. From 
defendant's admission that he had taken an injection of 
heroin two weeks before, it could be inferred that he had 
possessed heroin in violation of Health and Safety Code, sec-
tion 11500. [2] Moreover, since the validity of an arrest does 
not depend on whether the defendant may in fact be found 
guilty of the offense for which he is arrested (Coverstone v. 
I 
PEOPLE v. Rros 
[46 C.2d 297; 294 P.2d 39] 
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38 Oal.2d 315, 319 [239 P.2d 876]), and since in 
determining its validity the court is not limited to a con-
of evidence that would be admissible at the trial 
issue of guilt (People v. Boyles, 45 Oal.2d 652, 656 
P.2d 535] ; People v. Gorg, 45 Oal.2d 776, 780-781 [291 
469]), it is immaterial that defenJant could not be con-
of possessing heroin without independent proof of the 
delicti. 
Section 841 of the Penal Code provides that ''The 
person making the arrest must inform the person to be 
of the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the 
and the authority to make it, except when the person 
arrested is actually engaged in the commission of or an 
to commit an offense, or is pursued immediately after 
its commission, or after an escape." The magistrate was 
in concluding that this section was substantially 
complied with in this case. Defendant knew that Henry 
was an officer, and there is evidence that the expression 
"busted" is commonly used to indicate an arrest. Moreover, 
since defendant had just admitted the commission of an 
the cause of the arrest was reasonably apparent. 
People v. Martin, 45 Oal.2d 755, 762-763 [290 P.2c1 855]; 
lYillson v. Superior Cmtrt, ante, p. 291 [294 P.2d 36] .) 
Since the evidence justified the magistrate's con-
clusion that defendant's arrest was lawful, he properly re-
lied on evidence secured by the seareh of defendant's person 
incident to that arrest to establish probable cause to believe 
d0fcndant guilty of the offense eharged. 
The order is reversed. 
Cibson. C .• T., Schaner, .T., Spen<·<o, ,J., aiJ(1 :!\Il~Colllh, .T., 
t·oueurred. 
,T., coneurred in the judgment. 
CAH'1'ER, .T.-I dissent. 
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in People 
Orim. 5758, ante, p. 106 [293 P.2d 52], and 
v. Beard, Orim. 5809, ante, p. 278 [294 P.2d 291, 
I would affirm the order in the ease at bar. 
